SCARCEEARTH

Samarium

Sm · Atomic Number 62

Samarium
Samarium metal, SMM domestic China benchmark. Verified and updated weekly.
9.77
per kgas of Jul 5, 2026
Price historyJan 2023 – present

Quarterly benchmarks. Trend directional — for precise historical data see source links below.

Samarium metal, SMM domestic China benchmark. Verified and updated weekly.

Two Prices, One Market

The $9.77/kg figure is the SMM domestic China benchmark — the price Chinese manufacturers pay for samarium metal. Western sourcing for samarium operates under China's export licensing regime introduced in April 2025. The ceiling on NdFeB magnet performance — approximately 300–400°C — is the physical reason SmCo exists. Above that temperature, NdFeB magnets begin to demagnetize. SmCo magnets retain full performance above 700°C. This is not a material preference. It is a physics constraint. Every defense system that must operate under sustained heat — missile guidance, aerospace actuators, radar systems — sits above the NdFeB ceiling. That is why samarium cannot be substituted out of these applications, and why China's control of samarium production is a defense supply chain constraint, not a commodity market story.

DFARS 252.225-7052 takes effect January 1, 2027 — 180 days from today. Every qualifying defense magnet must be China-free. SmCo magnets in missile guidance, radar actuators, and aerospace systems require samarium. There is no substitute above 300°C.

What Is Samarium

Samarium is element 62 — a light rare earth element in the lanthanide series, sitting between neodymium and europium. Its commercial importance is almost entirely concentrated in a single application: samarium-cobalt (SmCo) permanent magnets, the only commercially proven magnet technology capable of operating reliably above 300°C.

The dominant commercial magnet technology — neodymium-iron-boron (NdFeB) — is stronger per unit volume than SmCo at room temperature. NdFeB is the magnet in EV motors, wind turbine generators, consumer electronics, and industrial robotics. But NdFeB has a hard physical ceiling. Above approximately 300–400°C, NdFeB magnets begin to demagnetize irreversibly. Adding dysprosium or terbium via grain boundary diffusion can push that ceiling somewhat higher. It cannot push it past approximately 200°C under sustained operation.

SmCo magnets retain full magnetic properties above 700°C. This is not a performance advantage that can be closed by improving NdFeB. It is a structural property of the samarium-cobalt crystal lattice. The physics are different. At the operating temperatures of missile guidance systems, radar actuators, and aerospace motor drives, SmCo is not one option among several. It is the option.

The F-35 Lightning II contains approximately 23 kilograms of samarium-cobalt magnets — in actuators, radar systems, and flight control mechanisms. The AMRAAM air-to-air missile guidance system uses SmCo. So do the phased array radar actuators in the Aegis combat system. None of these applications can migrate to NdFeB without fundamental redesign — and even a redesigned system would face the same physics at the same temperatures.

Plain English

NdFeB magnets stop working reliably above about 300°C. SmCo magnets work above 700°C. That gap is not engineering — it is physics. Missile guidance, radar actuators, and aerospace drives operate above the NdFeB ceiling. Those applications require SmCo. SmCo requires samarium. China controls samarium. The chain is short and there is no exit.

The Supply Picture — Why China Controls Every Gram

Samarium is not scarce in the ground. It is the fourth most abundant rare earth element in the Earth's crust — more abundant than neodymium, far more abundant than dysprosium or terbium. The supply constraint is not geological. It is processing.

China controls approximately 85–90% of global rare earth separation and refining capacity. Samarium, like other rare earths, occurs in mixed ore bodies — primarily bastnäsite, monazite, and ionic clay deposits. The ore must be mined, concentrated, chemically separated into individual elements, and then reduced to metal. Each step requires specialized facilities, chemistry, and process knowledge accumulated over decades. Outside China, the infrastructure to take samarium from ore to commercial-grade metal simply does not exist at scale.

China's April 2025 export licensing regime covers samarium explicitly. Every shipment of samarium — metal, compounds, or alloys — leaving China now requires a government export license. Approvals are discretionary. The regime does not require denial to be effective as leverage; approval uncertainty alone is sufficient to disrupt procurement planning for defense contractors with multi-year program timelines.

The Western response to samarium specifically has been even thinner than its response to neodymium or dysprosium. Projects building US and allied rare earth separation capacity — MP Materials, Energy Fuels, Lynas — are focused on neodymium-praseodymium and, secondarily, dysprosium and terbium. Samarium separation as a distinct commercial output is not a stated target of any major Western rare earth project with a near-term production timeline.

Plain English

Samarium is common in the ground. The problem is processing. China has the refineries. China has the chemistry. China has the process knowledge built up over 40 years. The rest of the world does not. April 2025 export controls mean every samarium shipment from China now needs government approval. No Western project has samarium separation as a near-term output. The supply is China's to give or withhold.

Defense Applications — Where the Physics Mandate SmCo

The defense supply chain's dependence on samarium-cobalt magnets is not a historical artifact that modern engineering has superseded. It is a current operational requirement that physics has not changed.

Missile guidance systems operate in environments that combine high ambient temperature, mechanical vibration, and electromagnetic interference. The guidance actuators — the mechanisms that move control surfaces to steer the missile — must maintain precise magnetic performance across the full thermal envelope of the engagement. A missile traveling at Mach 4 experiences aerodynamic heating that exceeds 300°C at the airframe surface. The guidance electronics must function throughout the flight. SmCo magnets do. NdFeB magnets at those temperatures do not.

Radar systems with electronically scanned arrays use high-torque motors to position antenna elements. In shipborne Aegis radar installations and airborne radar pods, these motors operate in confined spaces with limited thermal management. The motor magnets must maintain torque output at elevated operating temperatures. SmCo is specified.

Aerospace motor drives — in aircraft environmental control systems, hydraulic pump drives, and actuation systems — operate at continuous duty cycles that generate sustained heat. The motors are sized to fit specific airframe envelope constraints. Substituting NdFeB would require either accepting lower performance at operating temperature or redesigning the airframe envelope. Neither is a near-term option for fielded systems.

The F-35 program alone represents the scale of the dependency. With approximately 23 kg of SmCo per airframe, and a production program that has delivered over 1,000 aircraft with hundreds more contracted, the samarium content already embedded in the F-35 fleet and its production pipeline is measured in tonnes. Sustainment — replacement parts, maintenance spares, future production lots — extends that demand indefinitely.

Plain English

Missiles get hot at Mach 4. Radar motors run hot continuously. Aerospace actuators run hot at duty cycles. SmCo works above 700°C. NdFeB doesn't work reliably above 300°C. You can't substitute one for the other in systems already designed around SmCo thermal performance. The F-35 has 23kg of SmCo per airframe. There are over 1,000 in service. The demand is real, ongoing, and can't be redesigned away.

The DFARS Connection — The Same Clock, A Different Material

DFARS 252.225-7052 takes effect January 1, 2027. The provision requires that rare earth elements used in defense magnets — including samarium — be sourced entirely outside China, Russia, Iran, and North Korea. The requirement covers the full supply chain: mined, separated, processed, and melted.

For NdFeB magnets, there is at least a partial supply chain buildout underway. MP Materials is producing neodymium in the United States. Lynas is building separation capacity. The path to DFARS-compliant NdFeB is difficult, expensive, and behind schedule — but it exists as a project.

For SmCo magnets, the equivalent project does not exist. There is no Western samarium separation facility at commercial scale. There is no US samarium metal production. The DFARS clock for SmCo is running on an entirely different — and far less developed — supply chain. A defense contractor building a DFARS-compliant NdFeB magnet is navigating a difficult but active supply chain development effort. A defense contractor trying to build a DFARS-compliant SmCo magnet in January 2027 is navigating a supply chain that does not yet exist.

The GAO's July 2025 assessment of DoD supply chain visibility found “little visibility” into rare earth manufacturing origins and noted that supply chain efforts were “uncoordinated and limited in scope.” CSIS warned in April 2026 that adhering to DFARS requirements “may not be feasible” by the deadline. Both assessments were primarily framed around neodymium. The samarium situation is structurally worse.

Plain English

January 1, 2027 is the deadline for China-free defense magnets. For neodymium magnets, there is at least a plan — imperfect and behind schedule. For samarium-cobalt magnets, there is no Western samarium supply chain. Not slow. Not behind. Not planned. Not there. The DFARS clock is running on a supply chain that does not exist.

Why It Belongs on This List

The ScarceEarth framework asks one question: does this material sit at the physical floor of a system that cannot function without it?

Samarium sits at the physical floor of high-temperature defense applications. The physics of NdFeB magnet performance define a temperature ceiling that engineering cannot raise above approximately 200°C under sustained operation. The physics of SmCo define a ceiling above 700°C. The gap between those two numbers is where samarium lives, and where it cannot be displaced.

Every defense system that operates above the NdFeB ceiling — every missile that gets hot at speed, every radar that runs hot at duty cycle, every aerospace drive that heats under sustained load — requires SmCo. SmCo requires samarium. China controls samarium. China's April 2025 export controls make that control discretionary and active, not merely structural.

The price figure — $9.77/kg domestic China benchmark — understates the strategic value of the material. The price reflects a domestic Chinese market where samarium is a byproduct of light rare earth separation, available in quantity to Chinese magnet manufacturers. For a Western defense contractor attempting to source DFARS-compliant samarium, the market that figure describes does not exist as an accessible supply option. The number on the price card and the strategic reality of samarium supply are almost entirely disconnected.

Plain English

China controls the samarium. The magnet requires samarium. The missile requires the magnet. Above 300°C, there is no substitute magnet. The law requires a domestic supply chain by January 2027. The supply chain does not exist.

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Supply Concentration

Where this mineral is produced and how concentrated that production is. Concentration drives geopolitical risk — the fewer countries that produce a mineral, the more leverage any one of them has over global supply.

China99%
Other1%
Mining & Processing share

China controls all commercially usable samarium production. No alternative source operates at commercial scale.

Connected Companies

Companies with direct operational exposure to the samarium supply chain.

MP Materials

NYSE: MP

The only commercial-scale rare earth producer in the Western Hemisphere. Does not currently produce samarium or samarium-cobalt magnets at commercial scale. The integrated rare earth supply chain MP is building — mining, separation, and magnet manufacturing — is the foundation any domestic SmCo supply chain would require.

Energy Fuels

NYSE: UUUU

White Mesa Mill in Utah — the only US facility currently producing separated heavy rare earth elements from US-sourced monazite. Produces terbium and dysprosium at pilot scale. Samarium is a co-product of the same monazite processing stream. Targeting commercial-scale rare earth separation by 2027 — a timeline that runs concurrently with the DFARS January 1, 2027 deadline.

Lynas Rare Earths

ASX: LYC / OTC: LYSDY

The only confirmed commercial-scale non-China rare earth producer globally. Fort Worth HREE separation facility under construction with DoD backing. Lynas processes light rare earths including samarium at its Malaysia facility. No confirmed commercial SmCo magnet production — but the separation capacity Lynas operates is the upstream layer any Western SmCo supply chain depends on.

Almonty Industries

TSX: AII / OTC: AOIUF

Included for the tungsten-samarium intersection: SmCo magnets require both samarium and cobalt, but the broader defense magnet supply chain — and the DFARS compliance timeline — runs through the same procurement system that Almonty's Sangdong tungsten mine is entering. Sangdong Phase 1 commissioned March 2026.

Connected companies are included for informational context only. This is not a recommendation to buy or sell any security. Conduct your own due diligence.

Pricing data: Samarium metal 99.5%, SMM domestic China benchmark. Verified and updated weekly. F-35 SmCo content: approximately 23kg per airframe, based on program documentation and industry estimates. Export control regime: China Ministry of Commerce, April 2025. DFARS 252.225-7052: effective January 1, 2027, codified May 30, 2024. GAO supply chain assessment: July 24, 2025. CSIS feasibility warning: April 2026. As of June 2026.

The Chokepoint publishes investment research connecting physical reality to financial implication. williamdavid.substack.com